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JURISDICTIONAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF
ADOPTION
By JOSEPHa W. NEWBOLD*
T HE adoption of children, having to do, as it does, with
the question of the general interest in the individual life.
is not receiving, apparently, the legislative and judicial attention
which such a subject deserves. The clamor of classes for recog-
nition of particular interests,--shipping interests, manufacturing
interests, labor interests, is made by strong coperating organiza-
tions maintained to force a continual recognition of their de-
mands from the legislatures and courts. In this day of high
pressure legislation and tremendous volume of litigation, it is
natural that those demands which are most powerfully expressed
are given first attention. There is no question but that the
greater number of these demands are legitimate, and this fact,
in itself, furnishes added weight to the claims of the various
interests. Workable rules affecting the transportation of articles
of commerce,. the manufacture of goods, the number of hours
that an employee works, are engendered first in the minds of
those most closely connected with transportation, manufacture
and labor. These are the ones who appreciate the changes in
conditions which make impossible the application of a rule of
long standing. The first intimation of such a change seldom
impresses the legislature or the court, but the insistence with
which the claims are asserted gradually wears away the conserva-
tive considerations opposing the change, and the demands are given
judicial and legislative attention. The general interest in the
individual life does not produce a demand of sufficient definite-
ness and power to compete with the other more forcefully exerted
claims. Adoption of children is a definite conception but does
not have the sponsorship, and consequently, the consideration
which a subject of such importance requires. As a result of this
failure of legislative and judicial consideration, the adoption laws
in the United States are (1) improperly interpreted. (2) in-
adequate.
Adoption laws are usually misinterpreted in two main aspects:
(1) A failure on the part of judges to recognize the importance
*Of the Mt. Pleasant. Iowa, Bar.
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of the discretionary powers given them by the legislatures; (2)
Failure of courts to apply fundamental principles of law recog-
nized in analogous cases.
Nearly every statute which provides for the adoption of chil-
dren gives the judge before whom the application is made dis-
cretion in the matter.' If he is not satisfied by the evidence
which is submitted that the interests of the parties are advanced
by the adoption he is supposed to refuse a decree. Judges arc
very favorable toward adoptions. Their attitude apparently is
that most adoptions are good ones. This, however, is not the
opinion of those whose work keeps them in close contact with
adoption cases. The judge's impression of adoption is prone to
be the popular conception; that well-to-do persons, wishing to
share their good fortune, take a child to rear as their own. This
altruistic conception of adoption has been thrown over by the
welfare agencies who now report that the only safe presumption
to indulge is that the child is better off in a children's home than
in the home of an adoptive parent. This they deduce from the
statistics which they have gathered and the cases which they have
followed. A few examples of the kind of cases which have led
the agencies to this belief will be instructive.
A white woman appeared in a Boston court seeking the adop-
tion of a fourteen year old girl who accompanied her. The judge,
after asking the usual questions, decreed the adoption. Social
case workers later found this girl being abused by the woman's
negro husband and they had the adoption set aside. One month
later the same woman, bringing with her another girl, appeared
before the same judge, and he decreed another adoption. Again
the case workers made the discovery of the negro husband's
abusive use of this girl and were instrumental in having the
adoption set aside. When this situation was called to the atten-
tion of the judge his excuse was that no sufficient records of adop-
tion were kept which would enable him to detect anything amiss
in decreeing the second adoption by this woman within a month.-
1See for example: Montana, Rev. Code, 1921, sec. 5862; New York,
.onsolidated Laws (Birdseye, Cumming & Gilbert), 1918, ch. xv, art. 7;
Illinois, Rev. Stat., 1925, ch. 4; Wisconsin, Stat., 1923, sec. 4021-4023;
Colorado, Comp. Laws, 1923, see. 252-254.
-The writer is indebted to Miss Ida R. Parker, Associate Director
of the Research Bureau on Social Case Work, Boston, for this case. Miss
Parker believes that the reason no records of adoptions are kept is to
prevent the adopted child and parents being embarassed by persons who
could obtain information from such records. Miss Parker stated that
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Again, a woman who has five children, all under ten years of
age, does laundry work to support them and her drunken husband.
She has repeatedly sought, in the last two years, the adoption of
a baby and it is because of the energy of social workers that her
attempts have been frustrated. The social agencies in the locality
are constantly on the watch for this woman in order that they
may get to the court before she has an adoption decreed and tell
the judge the true situation. No doubt if she were not thus
closely observed she might persuade a judge whose attitude
toward adoptions is altruistic that the best interests of her family
and of the child would be furthered by decreeing the adoption.'
Such cases are by no means uncommon, in fact, in large centers
of population, they are the rule rather than the exception. Why
a woman who slaves to provide for her own children should wish
to adopt another child passes the bounds of ordinary reason, and
yet the fact remains and should be an example to judges of the
kind of thing which they must expect when they are called upon
to exercise their discretion in decreeing only those adoptions
which will make for the future welfare of family and child.
That such examples have not made some courts cautious in
adoption cases is evidenced by the tone of some of the decisions:
"The adoption of friendless, dependent or orphan children
tends to conserve the best interests of society and the state. All
states of the Union now have adoption statutes. The right of
adoption is not only beneficial to those immediately concerned,
but likewise to the public. It is not the duty of courts to bring
the microscope to bear upon such a case in order that every slight
defect may be magnified, so that a reason may be found for de-
claring invalid the proceedings under a beneficial statute of this
character. .. 4
It apparently would take a "preponderance of the evidence"
to convince this court that an adoption should not be decreed.
The attitude of mind with which judges of this type view adop-
tions seems to have set firmly, with results which already we have
seen. Thus one of the obstacles which must be encountered by
those seeking to secure the interests of adopted children, adoptive
parents, and of society, is this misuse of judicial discretion. The
remedy lies in the hands of those who have the opportunity of
almost every day persons come to her asking her to help them find out
who their parents were. Since no records of their adoption were kept it
is impossible to discover this information for them.3This case was discovered by Miss Stannard in her social work at
1000 Mass. Ave., Cambridge, Mass.
4Hopkins v. Gifford. (1923) 309 I1. 363, 141 N. E. 178.
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pointing out to courts the actual facts of cases in which this mis-
use of discretion has been the cause of suffering on the part of
adopted children and adoptive parents and has; in turn, reacted to
the detriment of the interests of society as a whole.
The second way in which adoption laws are misinterpreted by
the courts is in their failure to apply in adoption cases the funda-
mental principles of law recognized in analogous cases. For
example, it is hornbook law that adoption implies the changing
of a status.5 It has been defined as the act by which relations of
paternity and affiliation are recognized as legally existing between
persons not so related by nature.6 Not known to the common
law, in the United States it derives its existence solely from
statutes.7  In the United States, "adoption" is a technical term
which does not have the broad, unrestricted meaning which it had
in the civil law, which was that a personality was destroyed and
in its stead the creation of a new person as the natural son of
the adopting father." The fact remains that an adopted son is
not a natural son, but something less, and consequently, the status
which is created by an act of adoption must be the status of
adopted child and not the status of natural childY
It is a general rule that status is controlled by the law of the
domicile. 10 It follows, then, that the change of status which is
5Stearns v. Allen, (1903) 183 Mass. 404, 67 N. E. 349. "Personal
status is a vested personal condition or relation; a condition or relation
created and destroyed by an act of law, not by the mere consent of the
parties, and of legal importance to all the world. The quality of perma-
nence distinguishes status from consensual relations, such as those of
master and servant, or of principal and agent, where the relation depends
upon the mere will of the parties; and the close analogy between status
and property is shown by the fact that these two kinds of rights possess
in common the above stated characteristics of static rights." 1 Beale,
Treatise on the Conflict of Laws, 169.6Morrison v. Estate of Sessions, (1888) 70 Mich. 297, 38 N. W. 249;
Woodward's Appeal, (1908) 81 Conn. 152, 70 Atd. 453.
7Woodward's Appeal, (1908) 81 Conn. 152, 70 Atl. 453: Ross v. Ross.
(1880) 129 Mass. 243, 37 Am. Rep. 321; Chehak v. Battles, (1907) 133
Ia. 107, 110 N. W. 330; Keegan v. Geraghty, (1881) 101 Ill. 26; Morrison
v. Estate of Sessions, (1888) 70 Mich. 297, 38 N. W. 249.
sSee In Unforsake's Succession, (1896) 48 La. Ann. 546, 19 So. 602.
9Keegan v. Geraghty, (1881) 101 Il1. 26: but see Brewer v. Browning,
(1917) 115 Miss. 358, 76 So. 267, 519. "A relation similar to that of
fatherhood and sonship may be established between persons not naturally
related in the blood. Although this has many qualities analogous to that
of blood relationship, it is nevertheless not the same thing. The process
by which such a relation is established is called adoption; . 1 Beale,
Treatise on the Conflict of Laws, 147.
lORoss v. Ross, (1880) 128 Mass. 243, 37 Am. Rep. 321: Dunham v.
Dunham, (1894) 57 Ill. App. 475. "In the middle ages, the sovereign
who by convention had control of personal status was the sovereign of
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involved in adoption may be effected by the proper agencies within
that jurisdiction where all of the parties, i. e., adopting parents,
adopted child, and natural parents, are domiciled. A proper con-
sideration of the question whether it is necessary that all of the
parties be domiciled within the jurisdiction which changes the
status leads to an examination of the effect of adoption with
reference to each of the parties.
As to the effect of adoption upon the status of the child, there
can be no doubt but that he has a different status after he has
been adopted than he had before. A child owes his parents cer-
tain duties by virtue of the relationship of parent and child~1
No legal transaction is needed to bring these duties into being;
they exist as incidents to the relationship.' Adoption destroys
this relationship, as-much as it is physically possible, and creates,
to a like degree, such a relationship between the child and some
other person. It is impossible to alter the natural fact of parent-
age, but the incidents which inhere in that fact are taken away
and are created, as a legal phenomenon, between the child and a
person who is not his parent by nature. Legally, after adoption,
the child owes his natural parents no other duty than that which
he owes a stranger. Legally he owes a person who yesterday was
a stranger so much of the duties which a child owes his parents
as the law sees fit to provide." Thus the status of the child is
changed by the adoption.
It has been indicated that status is controlled by the law of the
domicile and that adoption effects a change in the status of the
child. Therefore only the state of the domicile of the adopted
child would have the proper authority to decree an adoption.
The cases, however, do not bear out this assumption. Much is
the domicile of the person concerned. This has continued to be the rule in
common law jurisdictions and in several civil-law states ...... 1 Beale,
Treatise on the Conflict of Laws, 174.
"Cooley v. Stringfellow, (1909) 164 Ala. 460, 51 So. 321. See also
Chaloux v. International Paper Co., (1909) 75 N. H. 281, 73 Atl. 301.
12See Porter v. Powell, (1890) 79 Ia. 151, 44 N. W. 29.
""The adoptive parents may exercise precisely the same control over
the child as though it were their own by birth, and are entitled to its
services, and on the other hand the child is entitled to the care and main-
tenance of such parents. The purpose of the statute was to establish the
relation of parent and child as completely as this may be possible between
strangers in blood,..... The relations of the child are severed from
its natural parents and affiliated with its adopted parents, so that the
former may not interfere with its care or custody any more than as
though a stranger." Ladd, J., in Chehak v. Battles, (1907) 133 Ia. 107,
110 N. W. 330, 334.
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said in them concerning the presence of the child in court, but
the question of domicile is usually ignored.
In Stearns v. Allen 4 the child adopted in Massachusettes was
a resident of that state but was domiciled in Scotland by virtue
of his father's domicile there. The adoption was held good, no-
tice having been given the father by publication. The court said:
"Adoption involves a change of status. So far as the adop-
ting parents are concerned, the change cannbt be made without
their consent. So far as the infant child is concerned, the state,
as his protector, may make the change for him. The natural
parents of the child should be considered and their natural rights
should be carefully guarded, but their rights are subject to regu-
lation by the state, and if these come into conflict with the para-
mount interests of the child, it is in the power of the state, by
legislation, to separate children from their parents when their
interest and the welfare of the community require it. Sec. 3
of this statute provided that the consent of parents to the adop-
tion shall not be required in certain cases of imprisonment of the
parent in the state prison or house of correction, of wilful deser-
tion of the child by the parent, or if he has suffered the child to
be supported for more than two years continuously by a charitable
institution, or as a pauper, or if he has been convicted of being
a common drunkard and neglects to provide proper care and
maintenance for the child, or if he has been convicted of certain
other offenses, and is guilty of such neglect."
But the court did not say that the father had been imprisoned
or had deserted the child or brought himself in any way within the
terms of this statute. What the court really does in this case is to
argue by analogy from the statute.
"In many cases the state may exercise and ought to exercise
jurisdiction over the child. If the child is actually dwelling in
the state, although his father's domicile is elsewhere, the state
may as well provide for his adoption as to provide for him in other
ways. Although the status of natural parent in reference to the
child is affected by the adoption, the jurisdiction which gives
the right to decree adoption is jurisdiction over the adopted par-
ents and the child, who are the parties whose status is directly
decreed. The incidental effect upon the status of the natural
parents is only in regard to certain rights of property and the
right of control. From the necessity of the case, inasmuch as it
has not always been possible to find all of the interested parties
in the same state, it is enough to establish jurisdiction which is
binding upon the natural parent if he is given reasonable notice
14(1903) 183 Mass. 404, 67 N. E. 349.
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of the pendency of the proceedings, and an opportunity to be
heard. .. "
The court admits that it must have jurisdiction over the child
and adoptive parents, but asserts that it has jurisdiction over a
child Personally present within the state but whose domicile is
outside the state, and this, for the purpose of changing his status.
This is dearly contrary to the general rule that status is controlled
by the law of the domicile. There have been ofher cases holding
that jurisdiction in adoption proceedings was had if the child was
in court, although he was a resident of another state.10
Adoption affects more than the status of the child adopted.
It changes the status of the adopting parent, and so, according
to the general rule that status is to be changed by the law of the
domicile, only the state wherein the adopting parents are domiciled
would have jurisdiction in the adoption proceedings. That the
status of the adopting parent is changed by the adoption is de-
monstrable. Prior to the adoption the adopting parent owes no
duty to the child which he does not owe to a stranger. After
the adoption the law imposes certain duties on the adopting
parent with regard to the child as a result of the new relationship
into which they have entered. 17 Although" some states may pro-
vide for adoption by contract, once the adoption is complete, the
characteristics of contract cease. The duties owed are incident
to the relation.' s Thus the status of the adopting parent is
changed.
The statutes of adoption with regard to adoption by residents
or non-residents may be characterized as follows: (1) Statutes
which prdvide that only residents of the state may adopt.1 9 (2)
Statutes which do not require the adopting parent to be a resident
15Ibid.
'6See Hopkins v. Gifford, (1923) 309 I1. 363, 141 N. E. 178, and
Woodward's Appeal, (1908) 81 Conn. 151, 70 At. 453.
"7"There are no limitations or qualifications as to the relationship
created and no limitations as to the rights of each with respect to the
other, which under the law grow out of the natural relation. Whatever
rights the natural parent and child possess under the laws of this state
are conferred and possessed equally by the adoptive parent and the adopted
child, and we are unable to conceive of any refinements of reasoning which
would warrant a distinction between the rights, duties and obligations of
the natural parent and child, and the rights, duties and obligations arising
between the adoptive parent and adopted child .. " Smith, J. in Cal-
houn v. Bryant, (1911) 28 S. D. 266, 133 N. W. 266, 274.
1SAn adoptivd parent may sue in his own name for the earnings of
the adopted child. Tilley v. Harrison, (1890) 91 Ala. 295, 8 So. 802.
'
9 1Minn. Gen. Stat., 1923, sec. 8624: Col. Comp. Laws, 1921, sec. 5512;
Wash. Rem. Code, ch. 22.
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of the state.2 0  (3) Statutes which have been construed to require
that the adopting parent be a resident of the state.2' (4) Statutes
which require the adopting parent to be a resident, but which are
construed to include a temporary resident.22 Courts cannot be
held responsible for the first two classes of statutes, but they are
responsible for the decisions made under the last two. That a
court has construed "resident" to include a temporary resident
shows plainly that the court either has not considered the question
as to whether the status of the adopting parent is changed by the
adoption or is purposely failing to adhere to the general rule that
domicile determines status.
Adoption affects still another status, that of the natural par-
ent. Natural parents owe certain duties to their children. When
a child is taken from them by adoption to some other person, the
duties incident to the relation of parent and child cease as be-
tween them. The position of the natural parents with reference
to the child is changed legally from that of parents to strangers. 3
According to the general rule, then, only a court of the state in
which the natural parents are domiciled would have jurisdiction
to adopt. This question is related closely to that of the domicile
of the adopted child because the domicile of the child is that of
his parents except where by law he has been allowed to acquire
a separate domicile.2' But it is to be remembered that the Massa-
chusetts court, in Stearns v. Allen,2 admitting that the domicile
of the natural father was not in Massachusetts, and without
showing that the child had acquired a separate domicile, allowed
the adoption.
The status of the child, of the adopting parents and of the
natural parents, is affected by the adoption. Status is governed
by the law of the domicile. Adoptions have been decreed in
jurisdictions other than that of the domicile of the child, other
than that of the adopting parents, and other than that of the
natural parents. Many courts apparently make an exception in
adoption cases to the general rule that domicile determines status.
The reason they do this would seem to be because of the same
20 Mass. Gen. Laws, 1921, ch. 210, sec. 1; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1913, ch. 4,
sec. 1; Conn. Gen. Stat. 1918, 4881 ; Mich. Comp. Laws, 1915, sec. 14140.2
'New Hampshire Gen. Stat., 1867 ch. 169, sec. 3-6.22Appeal of Wolf, (1888) 10 Sad. (Pa.) 139, 13 Atl. 760.
23See Mitchell v. Brown, (1912) 18 Cal. App. 117, 122 Pac. 426.
Contra, Taylor v. Deserve, (1891) 81 Tex. 246, 16 S. W. 1008.
24Ex parte Peterson, (D. C. Minn., 1908) 166 Fed. 536. In re Means,
(1918) 176 N. C. 307, 97 S. E. 39.
-(1903) 183 Mass. 404, 67 N. E. 349.
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altruistic attitude which was mentioned under the subject of tile
exercise of judicial discretion. There, it will be remembered,
courts failed'to see the dire results which attended wholesale adop-
tions. Their failure to apply to adoption cases fundamental prin-
ciples of Conflict of Laws must be attributed to the fact that they
have not had the necessity of such application called to their atten-
tion. They have not taken into consideration all of the interests
which are affected by adoption.
The interests to be protected by a scheme of adoption involve
those of the adopted child, of the adopting parents, of the natural
parents, of the community in which the child had his domicile,
and the community in which the child is to have his domicile sub-
sequent to the adoption. The first three are evident. The others
have not been recognized generally.
The state of the domicile of the child has an interest in secur-
ing a suitable home for him. The problem involved is that of
selecting proper persons to fill the r6le of parents. Certain stand-
ards should be required by the court decreeing the adoption. The
court must know something about the persons petitioning for the
adoption, something of their character, their motive for adopting,
their relations with one another if it is a married couple seeking
the adoption, and their financial ability and willingness to provide
proper education for the child. In order to go into these ques-
tions the court must call in witnesses personally acquainted with
the petitioners, must not only question those who are brought to
testify by the petitioners, but others whom perhaps the petitioners
are not anxious to hear testify. To reach such witnesses the
court must issue its process. If the petitioners live in another
state the most valuable witnesses would live in that state also.
The process of the court is powerless to reach them. The adop-
tion must proceed without all of the facts before the court and
as a consequence there is no assurance that the purpose of the
state in providing for adoptions is being carried out successfully.2 6
The domicile of the adopting parents which will be the domi-
cile of the child after the adoption has an interest in the adoption.
As soon as the child returns home with the petitioners the state
assumes the risk of maintaining him should he be neglected. If
the petitioners are not suitable persons the risk is great. If their
financial resources are not such that the child can be taken care
26That the state of the domicile of the child has an interest in the
adoption is entirely disregarded by M1r. Goodrich in his paper on adoption
in 22 'Mich.- L. Rev. 637, 647.
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of properly the burden falls on the state. If the child's education
be neglected through financial inability or indifference on the
part of the foster parents, the burden falls on the state. Any
deficiency in the character of the adopting parents may produce
a like deficiency in the character of the child. The consequences
are suffered by the state. Another aspect is with regard to the
child. While environment probably plays a greater part in mold-
ing character something must be said of heredity. Should one
state foist upon another the offspring of criminals, drunkards,
imbeciles, and indolents by the process of giving them as children
to the residents of the latter? One state has an interest in exam-
ining the fitness of the child just as both states have an interest
in examining the fitness of the foster parents.
Whatever may be said as to the inadequacy of the adoption
laws it seems apparent that these interests could be at least par-
tially secured by the courts applying general rules of law. For
example, if courts refused to decree adoptions unless all of the
parties were domiciled within the state, or if they refused to
recognize adoptions which had been decreed in other states with-
out all of the parties being domiciled in that state, they would
merely be applying the general rule that domicile governs status
and would be allowing all of the parties who had an interest,
including the state, to be heard. It has been pointed out, how-
ever, that many adoption statutes do not require the petitioners
to be residents of the state and many courts do not require the
child and the natural parents to be residents of the state, relying
only on the fact that some of the parties are before the court to
give the court jurisdiction.2 7
The suggestion that courts of one state should refuse to recog-
nize adoptions decreed in other states unless all of the parties
were domiciled in the state of the adoption leads to an examina-
tion of the question of recognition. The status of a person is to
be ascertained by the law of the domicile which creates the status
when, in the state in which it is called in question, there exists
neither positive rule nor public policy which would prohibit the
recognition of the status .2  As all of the states of the Union have
-The court has jurisdiction in proceedings to adopt if the child is in
court, although he is a resident of another state. Hopkins v. Gifford
(1923) 309 IIl. 363, 141 N. E. 178.
28Ross v. Ross, (1880) 129 Mass. 243, 37 Am. Rep. 321; Brewer v.
Browning, (1917) 115 Miss. 358, 76 So. 267; Finley v. Brown, (1909)
122 Tenn. 316, 123 S. W. 359, 25 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1285; Calhoun v. Bryant,
(1911) 28 S. D. 266. 133 N. W. 266; Woodward's Appeal, (1908) 81 Conn.
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adoption statutes, all recognize the status when properly created
in another state. "Properly created," however, has never been
construed to mean that all of the parties must be domiciled in
the state where the adoption is decreed unless such a requirement
existed in the law of that state. Coercion in the form suggested
cannot be relied upon to help cure the evils of adoptions which
are decreed without all of the parties being domiciled in the
state. So to rely upon it would be to upset the above rule con-
cerning recognition of status. The question of recognition of
status comes up most frequently in adoption cases where there is
a question of inheritance of property by the adopted child or the
adoptive parent. The decisions on this question are, on the whole,
very satisfactory. It is well established that the lex loci rei sitae
governs the distribution of the realty upon intestacy.?-  It is
equally sound that the lex loci domicilii decedentis governs the
distribution of personal property.30 When a child adopted in one
state seeks to be declared the heir of the intestate so as to inherit
property in another state he must show the court two things:
first, that he has been legally adopted and second, that the law of
the state where the land is situated or the domicile of the intestate,
as the case may be, permits one having such a status to take the
property.31 If the law of the two states is substantially the same
the great weight of authority holds that the foreign-adopted child
can inherit.32  The court in Ross v. Ross said :33
152, 70 AtI. 453; Melvin v. Martin, (1894) 18 R. 1. 650, 30 Atl. 467; Van
Matre v. Sankey, (1893) 148 Ill. 536, 36 N. E. 628, 23 L R. A. 665, 39
Am St Rep. 196; Shick v. Howe, (1908) 137 Iowa 249, 114 N. W. 916,
14 L. R_ A. (N.S.) 980; Succession of Caldwell, (1905) 114 La. 195, 38
So. 140; Simpson v. Simpson, (1906) 29 Ohio Cir. Ct. 503; McColpin v.
McColpin's Estate, (Tex. Civ. App. 1903) 77 S. W. 238; Gray v. Holmes.
(1896) 57 Kan. 217, 45 Pac. 59, 33 L. R. A. 207; Keegan v. Geraghty,
(1881) 101 I1. 26.
29Hood v. McGehee, (1915) 237 U. S. 611, 35 Sup. Ct. 718, 59 L. Ed.
1144; Colvin v% Jones, (1917) 194 Mich. 670, 161 N. W. 847; McLean v.
McLean, (1914) 92 Kans. 326, 140 Pac. 847; Calhoun v. Bryant, (1911)
28 S. D. 266, 133 N. W. 266, 274.
3OCalhoun r. Bryant, (1911) 28 S. D. 266, 133 N. W. 266, 274; Colvin
v. Jones, (1917) 194 Mich. 670, 161 N. W. 847; Anderson v. French,
(1915) 77 N. H. 509, 93 AtI. 1042.31Ross v. Ross, (1880) 129 Mass. 243, 37 Am. Rep. 321: Finley Y.
Brown, (1909) 122 Tenn. 316, 123 S. W. 359, 25 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1285;
Van Matre v. Sankey, (1893) 148 Ill. 536; 36 N. E. 628, 23 L. R. A.
665, 39 Am. St Rep. 196; Shick v. Howe, (1908) 137 Iowa 249, 114
N. W. 916, 14 L. R. A. (N.S.) 980; In re Williams Estate. (1894) 102
Cal. 70, 36 Pac. 407.
3-Woodward's Appeal, (1908) 81 Conn. 152, 70 Atd. 453; Van Matre
v. Sankey, (1893) 148 Ill. 536, 36 N. E. 628, 23 L. R. A. 665, 39 Am.
St. Rep. 196; McNamara v. McNamara, (1922) 303 I1. 191, 135 N. E.
410; Note, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 83; Shick v. Howe, (1908) 137 Iowa 249,
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"But the status or condition of any person, with the inherent
capacity of succession or inheritance, is to be ascertained by the
law of the.domicile which creates the status, at least when the sta-
tus is one which may exist under the laws of the state in which it
is called in question, and when there is nothing in those laws to
prohibit giving full effect to the status and capacity acquired
in the state of the domicile."
In some of the states although the status of adopted child is
recognized, the incidents of that status are not. Some of the
courts hold that there is a rule of property which allows only a
natural child to inherit. 34 These cases are based upon an English
case" in which the court held that it required more than mere
legitimacy, which was recognized as created by the law of Scot-
land, to entitle one to inherit land in England; it required legiti-
macy and being born in wedlock. On the analogy to this the
cases noted hold that their laws of descent do not recognize
adopted children. Very few American states attach such signifi-
cance to their statutes of descent."'
Although most of the decisions on recognition and inheritance
are satisfactory, some are very unsatisfactory and must be men-
tioned along with the rest. A peculiar decision, purporting to
rest upon the English case,37 was handed down by the Alabama
court.8 8  After deciding that the child adopted in Georgia was not
eligible to inherit land in Alabama and resting the decision on
the reason given in the English case, the court said,
"... and it may be, had he been adopted in this state in
pursuance to the statute authorizing the adoption of children, the
114 N. W. 916, 14 L. R. A. (N.S.) 980; Gray v. Holmes, (1896) 57
Kans. 217, 45 Pac. 59, 33 L. R. A. 207; Succession of Caldwell, (1912)
114 -La. 195, 38 So. 140; Ross v. Ross, (1880) 129 Mass. 243, 37 Am.
Rep. 321; Simpson v. Simpson, (1906) 29 Ohio Cir. Ct. 503; Melvin v.
Martin, (1894) 18 R. I. 650, 30 AtI. 467; Finley v. Brown, (1909) 122
Tenn. 316, 123 S. W. 359, 25 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1285; McColpin v. Mc-
Colpin's Estate, (Tex. Civ. App. 1903) 77 S. W. 238; James v. James,
(1904) 35 Wash. 655, 77 Pac. 1082.
33(1880) 129 Mass. 243, 37 Am. Rep. 321.
34Brown v. Finley, (1908) 157 Ala. 424, 47 So. 577; Smith v. Derr's
Adm'r., (1850) 34 Pa. St. 126, 75 Am. Dec. 641: Lingen v. Lingen, (1871)
45 Ala. 410.
a3Birtwhistle v. Vardill, (1826) 5 B. & C. 438; (1835) 2 Cl. & F.
571; (1840) 7 CI. & F. 895.
3OSmith v. Derr's Adm'r., (1850) 34 Pa. St. 125, 75 Am. Dec. 641;
Lingen v. Lingen, (1871) 45 Ala. 410; Brown v. Finley, (1908) 157 Ala.
424, 47 So. 577. In Ex parte Cline, (1925) 213 Ala. 599, 105 So. 686,
the court held that a child who had been adopted in Georgia was not a
"child" or "orphan" within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation
Act. For a discussion of this and similar decisions see 24 Mich. L. Rev.
496 and 25 Mich. L. Rev. 189.
37Birtwhistle v. Vardill, (1840) 7 Cl. & F. 895.
38Brown v. Finley. (1908) 157 Ala. 424, 47 So. 577.
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lands would have descended to him. But his adoption being
under the statute of another state which conferred upon him the
right of inheritance of the property of his adopting parent in that
state does not confer upon him that right in this state."
Thus the court having used a valid reason upon which to base
its decision, forthwith kicks the reason from under the decision
and leaves it suspended with no means of support.
The mere fact that the procedure of adoption is different in
two states should not keep one state from recognizing the status,
nor should it lessen the applicability of the incidents of the status
in the state in which those incidents are sought. In Ross v.
Ross,9 the leading American case on adoption, a difference in
the statutes of Pennsylvania and Massachusetts with regard to
the necessity of petitioner's wife joining in the adoption, the omis-
sion of any exception to the adopted child's capacity of inheriting
from the adopting parents, and the omission of the words "as if
born in lawful wedlock" did not constitute anything which was
contrary to the laws or public policy of Massachusetts and did
not preclude the child adopted according to this procedure from
inheriting the lands of her adoptive father in Massachusetts.
A contrary view was reached in a Mississippi case.40 The
child was adopted in Kentucky in this way. The adoptive parents
contracted with an orphans' home in Kentucky to adopt the child,
whereby the child should sustain "the same legal relation to them
as if she had been born unto them, and were their child, especially
as to such property as would descend to her were she their
child."'41 The orphans' home had been chartered and incorporated
by an act of the general assembly of Kentucky by which it was
empowered to allow any suitable person to adopt a child by exe-
cuting the proper covenants in writing and having them proven
in the county clerk's office. It was provided that when executed
and recorded "such child shall become the heir at law of such
person so adopting him or her, and be as capable of inheriting as
though he or she were the child of such persons.42 The supreme
court of Kentucky has held this act of incorporation constitutional
according to the facts brought out in the case; also that when this
contract was executed it amounted to a complete adoption in Ken-
tucky and authorized the child to inherit as if it were the natural
39(1880) 129 Mass. 243, 37 Am. Rep. 321.
4°Fisher v. Browning, (1914) 107 Miss. 729, 66 So. 132.4 1Fisher v. Browning, (1914) 107 Miss. 729, 731, 66 So. 132.
42Ky. Laws, 1879-80, c. 108. Also amendment of 1880.
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child of its foster parents. But when tie adoptive father died,
leaving land in Mississippi, the Mississippi court said:
"No such thing is known to the laws of Mississippi as adop-
tion by contract, nor can it be done by special act of the legislature
of Mississippi, . . .The proceedings for adoption followed in
Kentucky by the contract, etc., if pursued in Mississippi, would
undoubtedly be held to be null and void, and before a child
adopted, even in Mississippi, can inherit lands here, the jurisdic-
tional fact must be asserted in the petition that heirship is one of
the benefits to be conferred by adoption.143
In this case, then, a difference in procedure was considered to
be very material. Fortunately this case has been overruled. Un-
fortunately in its desire to become orthodox the court has fallen
over backward. In Brewer v. Browning,44 speaking of the same
case, the Mississippi court said that it was not contrary to the
laws of Mississippi for a person to adopt a child and make it
heir even though the adoption was not the kind which would have
been necessary in Mississippi. The ultimate question in the case
was whether the adopting parent could inherit from the child and
the court allowed it notwithstanding the protests of the dissenting
judges who pointed out that neither the laws of Kentucky nor
of Mississippi permitted such a thing. Thus the Mississippi
court has gone too far. It has disregarded the fact that the status
created is the status of adopted child, something less than natural
child. The effect of the decision is to discriminate against chil-
dren adopted in Mississippi in favor of children adopted in other
states, for while the former are allowed only the incidents attach-
ing to the adopted status, the latter are allowed the incidents
attaching to the natural relation.
When the state of adoption places a limitation upon inheri-
tance by adopted children, under which they may inherit, for
example, as a natural child except that they may not take from
the collateral kindred of the adoptive parents, two theories are
presented concerning the right of the child to inherit property in
another state where the laws allow adopted children to inherit as
if natural children. The diversity is caused by the different
fundamental conceptions of the exponents of the two views con-
cerning the nature of status. One view is that the status of an
adopted child is a known and invariable quantity. This status is
created by the state in its adoption statute and by subsequent
43Fisher v. Browning, (1914) 107 Minn. 729, 738, 66 So. 132.
44(1917) 115 Miss. 358, 76 So. 267, 519.
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procedure in accordance therewith; whatever follows concerning
the limitation of the right of inheritance of the adopted child is
merely a rule of inheritance and does not subtract anything for
the status of adopted child. The other view is that the status of
adopted child is a quantitative relation and that anything which
takes away from the incidents of the relation those rights which
are usually associated with the status, thereby creates a different
status, one in which the analogy to the natural relation is not
carried out to its furthest possible extent. The former is the
better, view. The weight of authority favors the view that the
adopted child be allowed to receive what the local rules of inheri-
tance give even though he shouid receive less under the law in
the state where he was adopted. For example in Anderson v.
FrenchW5 the child was adopted in Massachusetts under a statute
which provided
"that a child or person so adopted shall be deemed for pur-
poses of inheritance, and all other legal consequences of the
natural relation of parent and child, to be the child of the parent
or parents by adoption, as if born to them by lawful wedlock,
except that he shall not take property from the lineal or collateral
kindred of such parents by right of representation."
The New Hanipshire statute provided that the adopted child
should sustain the same relation to his-adopting parents and their
kindred in respect to inheritance of property as if a natural born
child, with one immaterial exception. The sister of the adoptive
father died in New Hampshire leaving personal property and the
question was whether the adopted child could have it. If it be
said that her status is limited by the words "except that he shall
not take property from the lineal or collateral kindred of such
parents by right of representation," then the New Hampshire
court must, in recognizing this status, allow the devolution of the
New Hampshire property within the bounds of this exception.
If it be said that the status of adopted child was created by the
Massachusetts statute, then the New Hampshire court can allow
whatever incidents New Hampshire attaches to such a status. A
majority of the judges took the latter view. Likewise in Calhoun
v. Bryant" the court allowed an adoptive parent to inherit from
the adopted child notvithstanding the fact that in Illinois, where
the adoption took place, such would have been impossible. " An
45(1915) 77 N. H. 509, 93 At. 1042.
46(1911) 28 S. D. 266, 133 N. W. 266.
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Iowa case, Estate of Sundcrland4 1 would seem at first glance to
be contrary but that decision was apparently the result of the
special Louisiana statute under which the child was adopted. It
was a special adoption act allowing this one adoption and as such
was construed by the Iowa court to create a delimited status, the
intention being clear that the adopted girl was not to inherit from
anyone except the adoptive parents.
If the situation is reversed, i. e., if in the state of adoption'
there is no limitation upon the inheritance of adopted children,
but in the state in which the land is located or where the intestate
was domiciled, as the case may be, there is a limitation upon
inheritance by adopted children,' the child adopted in a foreign
state cannot take more than he could have taken had he been
adopted in the latter state. The result is sound in view of the
general rule that the law of the situs in the case of land and the
law of the domicile of the intestate in the case of personality, gov-
erns the distribution of property. To allow the child to inherit
as much as he would have inherited under the law of the foreign
state where he was adopted would be giving that law extra-ter-
ritorial effect. In an Illinois case 4s the child, adopted in Wiscon-
consin, was seeking to claim as heir to a natural daughter of her
adoptive father the property left by the natural daughter domi-
ciled in Illinois. The Wisconsin statute would have allowed
it. The Illinois statute, however, did not permit an adopted
child to inherit property from the lineal or collateral kindred
of such parents by right of representation. The court, laying
down the rule stated above, held that the rights of inheritance ac-
quired by adoption in another state would be recognized and
upheld in Illinois only so far as they were not inconsistent with
Illinois laws of descent. Since the child could not have inherited
from the natural child of her adoptive father had she been
adopted in Illinois, the court said that she could not do so by
virtue of her adoption in a state where such inheritance would
have been possible.
So much for the cases on recognition of adopted children
and their rights of inheritance. It is apparent that these cases,
except those coming- from Alabama and Mississippi shopwing
some confusion on the subject, cannot and must not be over-
thrown in order to exert pressure on foreign courts to decree
47(1882) 60 Ia. 732, 13 N. W. 656.48Keegan v. Geraghty, (1881) 101 Ill. 26.
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adoption only where all the parties are domiciled in the state. The
remedy will have to come from the states themselves either
through their legislatures or their courts, perhaps both.
Not all of the fault lies with the court. Our adoption laws
are surprisingly devoid of the modern mechanical devices which
would make them operate smoothly and efficiently. Our recent
administration methods have not been used to any great extent.
Adoption laws in most states are substantially the same as they
were when they were first enacted in this country. Four states
still provide for adoption by contract .4  Even this method, used
in sparsely settled communities, would seem to give better re-
sults than the misuse of discretion by judges in more densely
populated areas. If courts persist in decreeing adoptions witl4
no substantial showing that the interests of children and parents
are advanced, the only remedy is to prescribe by legislation bet-
ter methods for adoptions. So also if courts refuse to apply
the general rule that status is governed by the law of the domicile.
A few courts have made it a rule never to decree an adoption
until the social workers in that district have been notified of the
case and have had time to find out all of the circumstances which
would have a bearing on the advisability of allowing the adop-
tion.50 As a rule the findings of the workers determine whether
the adoption will be decreed. An act of the legislature incorporat-
4 9Iowa requires only that an instrument signed by the consenting
parents, containing the names of the parents, child and adopting parents,
and their places of residence, the name by which the child is to be called,
and a statement that the child is given to the person adopting as his own,
and signed by the person adopting, be acknowledged by all of the parties
thereto in the same manner that deeds conveying real estate are acknowl-
edged and recorded in the recorder's office of the county where the person
adopting resides, indexed in the name of the person adopting as grantor
and the original name of the child as grantee. Iowa Code, 1924 ch. 473.
In Texas the adopting parent files in the office of the county clerk
a written statement showing in substance his intent to adopt. This state-
ment must be acknowledged in the same manner as deeds and recorded in
the county clerk's office. Texas, Rev. Civ. Stat., 1925, art. 42.
In Alabama and Vermont the persons desiring to adopt appear before
the probate court with ari instrument signed by witnesses and setting
out the name of the child, the adopting parents and the natural parents.
The court has no discretion, merely taking the acknowledgments and
filing the same in its records. Ala. Code 1923, sec. 9302; Vt. Gen. Laws,
1917, ch. 170.
5GIn Cuyahoga County, Ohio, by special arrangement between agencies
and the courts, all adoptions are investigated. All cases are reported
by the court to the social service clearing house. If the case has not
come already to the attention of the agency, an investigation is made
and information regarding the child's family and prospective parents is
filed with the court. See, A Study of Adoptions in Cuyahoga County,
The Family, Jan. 1926, p. 259.
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ing in it some such plan would be a great improvement over the
usual methods prescribed.5 Of course law is only one method of
social control. One method, although inadequate, need not be
altered if other methods are meeting the difficulties. Much good
work has been done by the social agencies toward filling in the
gaps left by the adoption laws. They have brought to light many
astonishing facts concerning adoption. They have found that
in a great percentage of the cases the petitioners are entirely in-
competent to assume the duties of parents, that many of the
children offered for adoption are from the first to the fourth
illegitimate child of its mother. They have found that natural
and adopting parent alike do not fancy the "red tape" connected
with adoptions which are supervised by the agencies, and the
result is that advertisements appear in the papers telling of
children for adoption. These advertisements are answered and
the adoption takes place the next day, sometimes even the same
day the advertisement appears. They have found that the courts
are of the belief that they are being humanitarian by decreeing as
many adoptions as possible, insisting, perhaps, on seeing one of
the adopting parents. But the experience of the agencies is that
better results are obtained when children are "boarded out" under
agency supervision than when they are adopted indiscriminately.
Only a small part of the children who are placed with an agency
for adoption are ever adopted. The agency finds few cases where
the interests of all concerned will be bettered by adoption."2 The
agencies are trying to fill the gaps left by the law, but it is imi-
possible for them to do so entirely.
Voluntary submission of adoption cases to social workers is
not practiced by a sufficient number of courts to justify the
belief that it will become a general rule. Voluntary acceptance
of advice of social workers by adoptive parents is not to be
expected in a very large number of cases in view of the various
motives of those who seek to adopt. Those who believe that the
interests of society as a whole depend largely on the furtherance
of the interests of the individual see in adoption cases an oppor-
5'A few states have provided for special investigation. See for exam-
pie Minn. Gen. Stat. 1923, ch. 73. This statute provides that when a
petition for adoption is presented the court must notify the state board
of control. The board verifies the allegations of the petition, investigates
the condition and antecedents of the child, if the proposed foster home
is suitable, and reports in writing to the court with a recommendation
as to the granting of the petition.
52Miss Ida R. Parker, Associate Director of the Research Bureau on
Social Case Work, Boston, provided these enlightening facts.
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tunity for great improvement over existing methods. There are
interests which are not protected by existing laws and methods of
administration. There are existing claims which because of the
very nature of such cases remain inarticulate. The forceful ex-
pression of these claims no doubt eventually will attract legislatures
and courts and it can then be anticipated that administrative
methods will replace the existing inadequate laws and courts will
be apprised of facts which will lead them to abandon their improp-
er interpretation of those laws.
